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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Until recently, the design of domestic agricultural policies in developed countries 
has given priority to methods that guarantee a price floor for agricultural 
commodities. Price support mechanisms can range from supply restrictions 
imposed on the domestic market, price subsidies, or public purchases of 
agricultural commodities to offset excess supply. A wide literature has shown 
that price support mechanisms may intensify production practices and bring 
about significant deadweight losses (Gardner, 1992). The unfavourable 
consequences of agricultural protectionism became widely recognized by the 
1980s. It became clear that agricultural intervention based on price guarantees 
and other market insulating policies led to overproduction, which in turn brought 
about market distortions and disagreements in multilateral trade policy 
negotiations. Recognition of these problems motivated multilateral and/or 
bilateral trade agreements that advocated for agricultural protectionism 
dismantling processes. In the framework of these agreements, different countries 
have reformed their domestic agricultural policies. Economic theory views lump 
sum transfers as the most efficient method to redistribute income among 
individuals (Williamson, 1996). The trade-off between political pressures for 
continued support to farmers and the policymakers’ will to reduce efficiency 
losses resulted in an increased use of decoupled agricultural policies. Decoupling 
is a term used to designate the break of the link between subsidies and 
production. Price supports are usually replaced by lump sum income transfers 
that do not depend on actual production or prices.  
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The conventional approach to the analysis of the effects of agricultural 
policies on farmers’ profit maximization decisions has been to assume perfect 
markets (including credit markets), risk neutral producers and constant returns to 
scale. Under these assumptions, the literature has shown that the impacts of 
decoupled policies on production decisions are limited. However, if economic 
agents are not risk neutral, markets are imperfect, or returns to scale are other 
than constant, apparently decoupled payments could have more implications (see 
Phimister, 1995; Hennessy, 1998; or Rude, 2001). A number of studies that have 
assessed economic agents’ risk preferences have found evidence in favour of risk 
aversion (see, for example, Hansen and Singleton, 1983; Chavas and Pope, 1985; 
Pope and Just, 1991). If uncertainty and risk preferences are introduced in the 
analysis of the impacts of decoupling, results suggest that apparently decoupled 
policies can influence production decisions (Hennessy, 1998; Sandmo, 1971). It 
is thus very important to account for risk and risk preferences when assessing the 
effects of decoupling.  
When coupled or partially coupled, income supports often involve 
restrictive supply management rules that limit farmers’ capacity to respond to 
market conditions. For example, eligibility for public subsidies is usually made 
conditional upon producing specific crops, the program crops. In this regard, 
decoupling involves increased planting flexibility in that direct payments are not 
tied to the production of certain commodities. Farmers being allowed more 
planting flexibility are likely to be more responsive to market conditions and 
alter their crop mix accordingly. To the extent that planting flexibility includes 
the possibility of agricultural land idling, farmers will also consider setting land 
aside when taking their decisions on land allocation.  
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There are yet other mechanisms through which the decoupling of 
agricultural policies can influence land allocation decisions. These mechanisms 
are the changes in relative market prices and farmers’ risk attitudes. The 
reduction in price supports is likely to make program crops less attractive relative 
to non-program commodities and land idling. Also, to the extent that farmers’ 
risk preferences are influenced by wealth (Sandmo, 1971; Just and Pope, 1978; 
Hennessy, 1998; Just and Zilberman, 1986) and to the extent that decoupled 
payments and price changes have the potential to affect the wealth of participant 
farmers, their willingness to assume risk may be altered. Because risk is a 
fundamental component of agricultural production and because yield variability 
can differ by crop type, government transfers might affect farms’ land use by 
means of altering farmers’ risk attitudes.   
Decoupled agricultural payments were introduced in the United States 
(US) with the 1996 Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act, 
which involved a substantial change in the way income support was provided to 
farmers. With the FAIR Act, market price supports and deficiency payments 
were being partially replaced by Production Flexibility Contract (PFC) Payments 
whose amount and entitlement would not depend on actual production or prices, 
and a deficiency payment program that guaranteed a minimum support price for 
program crops including soybeans. While under the 1990 Act and with the 
exception of the flex acres, producers were required to plant the base acreage to 
the base crop in order to be eligible for deficiency payments, entitlement to 
receive PFC was based on qualified acres historically enrolled in commodity 
programs, allowing land to be put to any agricultural use, including the 
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production of any crop with the exception of fruits and vegetables (unless it was 
used in this way in the past), or idled.   
The purpose of this article is to study the impacts of decoupling on land 
allocation decisions. Our analysis contributes to the literature by formally 
assessing the effects of decoupling on farms’ crop mix and on the decision to set 
land aside. The analysis is undertaken within the framework of the model of 
production under uncertainty developed by Just and Zilberman (1986). We 
extend this model to study supply responses to decoupled payments and to 
include set aside among land use alternatives. Though various analyses have 
addressed the effects of decoupling on producers’ decisions, no existing research 
has studied the impacts of decoupled payments on farms’ land allocation using 
the extended Just and Zilberman (1986) model. Our empirical application 
focuses on a sample of Kansas farms observed from 1998 to 2001. Results 
suggest that US agricultural policy decoupling could have involved a shift in land 
use away from program crops towards non-program commodities offering higher 
expected profits and idle land.  
 
 
II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The objective of our model is to assess the effects of decoupling on farm land 
allocation. We adopt Just and Zilberman (1986) model of production under 
uncertainty. Because agricultural producers are not likely to be neutral to risk, 
farmers’ risk preferences are explicitly considered. Our model defines risk 
preferences as a function of wealth (Just and Zilberman, 1986; Pope and Just, 
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1991; Hennessy, 1998). If economic agents are risk averse and their risk 
adversity decreases with wealth (Pope and Just, 1991; Bar-Shira, Just and 
Zilberman, 1997), an increase in decoupled payments is expected to alter the 
crop mix towards more risky crops that offer higher expected margins. The 
reduction in price supports for program crops that characterizes a decoupling 
process will reduce the attractiveness of these crops in favour of non-program 
commodities and/or idle land. Apart from the substitution effects, a change in 
output prices will also have an income effect that, under the assumption of 
decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) preferences, is likely to increase risk 
adversity. 
The 1996 FAIR Act involved the introduction of decoupled payments that 
allowed, with some restrictions, full planting flexibility. We extend Just and 
Zilberman (1986) model to allow for these payments and the possibility to 
receive them even if agricultural land is left idle. Our model offers an improved 
picture of farmers’ behaviour by allowing to optimize land allocation in response 
to policy. We model PFC payments as simple lump sum transfers, thus 
recognizing that under the new scenario farmers will manage their crop mix in 
accordance with market conditions.  
 Consider a firm that produces two outputs, crop 1 and crop 2. Crop 1 
represents a program crop in that eligibility for government payments under the 
old policy regime required crop acres be planted to this crop. Crop 2 is a non-
program crop. Yields per acre are defined as uncertain variables and expressed as 
1 2( , )y y=Y . For simplicity, it is assumed that producer uncertainty derives only 
from production, but not from market conditions. If additive production risk is 
assumed, the production function of crop i  can be expressed as ( )i i i iy y x ε= + , 
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where ix  is the per acre quantity of a variable input x  allocated to the production 
of crop i , and iε  is a stochastic error term with mean [ ] 0iE ε =  and variance 
[ ] 2var i iε σ= . The first two moments of the joint distribution of yields are 
denoted by 1 1
2 2
y y
E
y y
   
=   
   
 and 
2
1 1 1 2
2
2 1 2 2
cov
y
y
σ ρσ σ
ρσ σ σ
  
=   
   
, where ρ  
represents the correlation coefficient among the two crop yields. The quasi rents 
derived from crop i  are expressed on a per acre basis as i i i ip y wxΠ = − , being 
the first two moments of the joint distribution of quasi rents 1 1
2 2
E
Π  Π 
=   Π Π   
 and 
2
1 1 1 2
2
2 1 2 2
cov
ϖ ρϖ ϖ
ρϖ ϖ ϖ
Π   
=   Π   
, where i i ipϖ σ= . 
Total crop land ( )A 1 is allocated to the production of the two crops 
considered or left idle yielding the following vector of land allocation: 
( )1 2 3, ,A A A=A , where 1 2 3A A A A= + + , 3A  represents idle land and 1A  and 2A  
symbolize land allocated to program and non-program crops respectively. The 
problem of land allocation can alternatively be expressed in proportions as 
( )1 2 3, ,L L L=L , where ii AL A=  and 1 2 3 1+ + =L L L . 
It is assumed that farmers take their decisions with the aim of maximizing 
the expected utility of  their wealth [ ]
1 2 3 1 2, , , ,
max ( )
L L L x x
E u W =  
( )
1 3 1 2
0 1 1 2 1 3
, , ,
max (1 )+ + Π + Π − −  L L x x E u W G AL A L L , where W  represents farms’ total 
wealth, 0W  stands for farms’ initial wealth, and G  are decoupled income-support 
                                                 
1
 Because for our sample of farms crop land remained almost constant during the period of 
analysis, A  is assumed to be fixed. 
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payments.  The quasi rent associated to idle land is assumed to be equal to zero. 
Following previous literature, we assume risk neutrality in the input decision2 
which leads to independence of land allocation from variable input decisions 
(Just and Zilberman, 1986). Under this assumption the first order conditions of 
the land allocation problem can be expressed as:  
 
[ ] ( )1 2
1
0
∂ ∂ 
= Π − Π ≥ ∂ ∂ 
E u uE
L W
 (1.1) 
[ ] ( )2
3
0
∂ ∂ 
= −Π ≥ ∂ ∂ 
E u uE
L W
 (1.2) 
 
By approximating the marginal utility around the expected wealth 
( )0 1 1 2 1 3(1 )= + + Π + Π − −W W G AL A L L  through a second-order Taylor series 
expansion, the first order conditions can be alternatively expressed as: 
 
( ) { }1 2 1 1 3 2(1 ) 0ν νΠ − Π − + − ≥R L LA  (2.1) 
{ }2 1 2 3 3( ) (1 ) 0ν ν−Π − − + − ≥R L LA  (2.2) 
 
                                                 
2
 As Just and Zilberman note, the assumption of risk neutrality is very common in models with 
stochastic production and is necessary for the dual cost and production functions to be 
independent of risk preferences. This assumption allows to derive a theoretical framework that is 
more tractable at the empirical level. 
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where 
12
2( )
−
 ∂ ∂ 
= = −  ∂ ∂  
u uR R W
W W
 represents the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of 
absolute risk aversion.  Following Bar-Shira, Just and Zilberman (1997) we 
assume R  is a function of farms’ expected wealth that can be represented by 
R W βη= , where η  and β  are parameters. This is a flexible specification in that 
it does not restrict the specific type of farmers’ risk preferences. Risk adverse 
(neutral) [seeking] attitudes are represented by ( )[ ]0η > = < . We assume farmers 
to be risk-averse ( > 0η ). The wealth elasticity of absolute risk aversion 
corresponds to β . If farmers have decreasing (constant) [increasing] absolute 
risk aversion preferences, ( )[ ]0β > = < . In accord with previous studies (Bar-
Shira, Just and Zilberman, 1997; Isik and Khanna, 2003) we assume here that 
farmers have DARA preferences ( < 0β ). Expression 1 =v 2 21 1 2 22ϖ ρϖ ϖ ϖ− +  
1
var 0T
L
 ∂Π
= > ∂ 
 is the variance of the marginal profit derived from increasing 
land allocated to crop 1i =  and 1 1 1 3 2(1 )Π = Π + − − ΠT L L L . The result of 
multiplying 2v
2
1 2 2ρϖ ϖ ϖ= −  by 3(1 )− L  is 
1
var1
2
∂ Π
∂
T
L
, which represents one-
half the marginal variance of profit when 1 0L = , i.e. at zero capacity allocation. 
Finally, 23 2ϖ= −v  corresponds to the negative value of the variance of non-
program crop quasi rents. Note that expressions (2.1) and (2.2) above involve the 
equalization of the marginal mean income effect derived from an increase in land 
allocated to crop i  and the marginal risk effect discounted to a certainty 
equivalent by using the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion. 
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 In order to determine the effects of decoupling on land allocation 
decisions, we use comparative statics. The consideration of a multi-product land 
allocation problem involves substantial complexity relative to a more simplified 
two-product model and yields comparative statics formulae that cannot be 
signed. In order to make comparative statics more simple, but also more clear, 
we simplify the model to a consideration of only two alternatives in the land 
allocation problem: 1L  and iL , 2,3i = .
3
 It is important to note that model 
simplification is only limited to the comparative statics analysis in this section, 
and that the empirical implementation will be based upon the generalized three-
product model.  
 Let’s consider a land allocation problem that only includes program and 
non-program commodities. In such scenario the system of first-order conditions 
is reduced to: 
 
( ) { }1 2 1 1 2 0ν νΠ − Π − + =R LA  (3) 
 
where 1
1
varν
 ∂Π
=  ∂ 
T
L
,  2
1
var1
2
ν
∂ Π
=
∂
T
L
, and 1 1 1 2(1 )Π = Π + − ΠT L L . As 
explained above, in a decoupling process lump sum payments are usually 
introduced to replace price supports. Our comparative statics analysis thus 
focuses on determining the sensitivity of the crop mix to changes to program 
                                                 
3 Note that this simplification is economically reasonable as it represents two possible corner 
solutions that can apply to our problem, i.e. that farmers decide not to set land aside or diversify 
the crop mix. 
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crop prices and to lump sum payments. The comparative statics results can be 
summarized in the following propositions (proofs are presented in the appendix).  
 
PROPOSITION1. Land allocated to the program crop ( = 1i ) increases with an 
increase in decoupled payments (G ) if 2
1
ϖρ
ϖ
> , or if 2
1
ϖρ
ϖ
−∞ < <  and 
1 1 2ν ν>L . On the other hand, land allocated to the program crop decreases 
with an increase in G  if 2
1
ϖρ
ϖ
−∞ < <  and 1 1 2ν ν<L . 
  
Proposition 1 can be economically interpreted as follows. An increase in 
decoupled payments improves farmers’ wealth which in turn increases their 
willingness to assume more risk. This could reduce the attractiveness of crop mix 
diversification as a strategy to manage farm income risk. This will only be 
pursued if yields correlation is negative or takes low positive values, and if an 
increase in program crop production would substantially reduce the profit ( TΠ ) 
variance. Otherwise diversification will not be pursued. 
 
PROPOSITION 2. For a negative value of the mean effect of production, land 
allocated to the program crop decreases with an increase in 1p  if 0ρ <  and 
1 2
1
1 1
ν ν∂ ∂
>
∂ ∂
L
p p
, if 1
2
0 ϖρ
ϖ
< < , or if 1
2
ϖρ
ϖ
>  and 1 21
1 1
ν ν∂ ∂
<
∂ ∂
L
p p
. Otherwise, 
land allocated to crop 1 only decreases if the mean effect outweighs the risk 
effect. 
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The economic meaning of proposition 2 can be expressed as follows. If the 
expected mean effect of production is negative, an increase in 1p  only motivates 
an increase in 1L  if this increase involves some gains in terms of risk 
management that outweigh the negative mean effect. If yields are negatively 
correlated, the gains in terms of risk management require a substantial reduction 
in the marginal variance of profit. However, if yields are highly and positively 
correlated (and thus diversification towards 2L  is less attractive) a small increase 
in the marginal variance is tolerated, as long as the risk effect is of bigger 
magnitude than the mean effect. 
 
PROPOSITION 3. For a positive value of the mean effect of production, land 
allocated to the program crop increases with an increase in 1p  if 0ρ <  and 
1 2
1
1 1
ν ν∂ ∂
<
∂ ∂
L
p p
, or if 1
2
ϖρ
ϖ
>  and 1 21
1 1
ν ν∂ ∂
>
∂ ∂
L
p p
. Otherwise, land allocated to 
crop1 only increases if the mean effect outweighs the risk effect. 
 
Proposition 3 thus shows that, being the expected mean effect positive, no 
diversification in favour of non-program crops is pursued if yields correlation is 
high and positive. However, if 0ρ <  an increase in 1L   requires an important 
reduction in the marginal variance of profit. 
In order to assess the effects of decoupling on idle land, we now consider 
a model that studies the allocation of land among program crop production and 
set aside. In such a situation, the first order condition in (3) changes to (4) below: 
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21
1 1 0ϖ
Π
− =RL
A
 (4) 
 
Comparative statics allow to formulate the following two propositions: 
 
PROPOSITION4. Idle land is reduced with an increase in decoupled payments. 
 
This is due to the fact that an increase in decoupled payments reduces farmers’ 
degree of risk aversion increasing their willingness to assume more risk. Given 
that idle land involves no risk, this alternative becomes less attractive in favour 
of producing agricultural commodities.  
 
PROPOSITION5. For a negative value of the mean effect of production, idle 
land increases with an increase in 1p  to the detriment of 1L . However, if the 
mean effect of production is positive, idle land only increases if the risk effect 
outweighs the mean effect.  
 
In a situation where the mean effect of production is positive, farmers have the 
incentive to increase the amount of land allocated to program crops to the 
detriment of idle land, as long as the increase in production risk discounted to a 
certainty equivalent does not outweigh the mean effect. However, if the mean 
effect is negative, an increase in 1p  reduces program crop land in favour of idle 
land. 
 In summary, our comparative statics analysis shows that decoupled 
payments have the effect of reducing idle land. In contrast, the reduction in 
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program crop price supports can motivate land set aside. Decoupled payments 
can also stimulate a change in crop mix in favour of non-program commodities. 
This shift requires yields correlation to be negative or take low positive values. A 
decrease in program crop price supports can also boost non-program crops 
acreage under certain conditions. It is relevant to note that, with the exception of 
the influence of decoupled payments on idle land, the net effects of decoupling 
depend on issues such as yields correlation, changes in the variance of profit, or 
the magnitude of the  mean and risk production effects. This impedes to 
anticipate the response to a decoupled program making it necessary to determine 
it empirically.  
 
 
III. EMPIRICAL APPLICATION 
 
As explained above, our empirical application is focused on the analysis of the 
effects of the US agricultural policy reforms in 1996 on land allocation decisions 
taken by a sample of Kansas farms. Specifically, we are interested in observing 
how the planting flexibility provisions and the decoupling of farm income 
support influenced Kansas farms’ land use.  
 Farm-level data are taken from farm account records from the Kansas 
Farm Management Association database for the period 1998 to 2001. 
Retrospective data for these farms are also used to define some lagged variables 
used in the application.4 The Kansas Farm Management Association database 
collects information from individual farms on an annual basis through a 
                                                 
4
 To be able to do so, a complete panel of data is built out of our sample. 
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cooperative record-sharing, farm management, and tax preparation arrangement. 
Around 2,500 full-time commercial holdings with gross sales exceeding 
$100,000 provide data to this database. Various farm types and areas in Kansas 
are represented in the dataset (Albright, 2001). The variables in the database 
include, among other information, farm financial and production data, balance 
sheet, cash flow and income statements. Our analysis is based on farm-level data, 
but aggregates are also used to define important variables that are unavailable in 
the farm-level dataset. These aggregates are taken from the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the National Agricultural Statistics 
Service (NASS). USDA provided state-level PFC payment rates and NASS 
facilitated country-level price indices and state-level output prices and quantities.  
 Table 1 contains summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis. 
Following our model specification, we consider a variable input x  that includes 
the application of herbicides and fertilizer, representing the main variable costs 
for the farms in the sample. Because input prices are not available from the 
Kansas database, we define w  as a country-level input price index. An implicit 
quantity index for variable inputs is derived through the ratio of input use in 
currency units to the corresponding price index. The Kansas dataset does not 
provide information on the consumption of variable inputs by crop. We use Just 
et al. (1990) behavioural proposal to allocate variable input use among different 
crops.5 
                                                 
5
 We should note here that another allocation mechanism based on profit maximization was also 
used, but yielded inconsistent results. This is not surprising in light of Just et al. (1990) findings 
that the behavioural method is superior.  
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 Two output categories are distinguished as quantity indices per acre ( 1y  
and 2y ). Variable 1y  represents program crops and includes the production of 
wheat, corn, and grain sorghum per acre. Variable 2y  is the production of 
soybeans representing a non-program commodity. Together, wheat, corn, 
sorghum and soybeans represent the main crops in Kansas. Paasche indices for 
both crops are computed using state-level output prices and production to define 
1p  and 2p .  
 iA  represents land allocated to alternative 1,2i = ,3, being A  the variable 
representing total crop acres, 3A  the acres left idle, and 1A  and 2A  the crop acres 
planted to program and non-program crops respectively. By using iy , ix , ip , w , 
the value for iΠ  can be determined. Computing quasi rents at the farm-level 
involves some problems. First, not every farm produces crop i 6 every year and 
when this happens iΠ  cannot be determined at the farm-level. Second, the 
composition of 1y  can vary annually within a farm as the hectares planted to 
wheat, corn and sorghum change, which complicates the definition of a 
reasonable value for 1Π  at the farm-level. In light of these problems, we define 
quasi rents using annual sample-means for the production and input consumption 
variables.7  
                                                 
6
 The problem applies to crop 2i = . 
7
 It is important to note here that other alternatives were also considered, including the use of 
farm-level iΠ  values whenever possible (and averages otherwise), or the use of the Kansas 
Farm Management Association crop budgets (http://www.agmanager.info/crops/). However, 
these alternatives yielded results in contrast to widely accepted previous research results and thus 
were discarded. 
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 Kansas database does not register PFC government payments. Instead, a 
single measure including all government payments received by each farm is 
available. To derive an estimate of farm-level PFC payments, the acreage of 
program crops (base acreage) and the base yield for each crop are approximated 
using farm-level data. The approximation uses the 1986-88 average acreage and 
yield for each program crop and farm. PFC payments per crop are derived by 
multiplying 0.85 by the base acreage, yield and the PFC payment rate. PFC 
payments per crop are then added to get total direct payments per farm.8 A 
farm’s initial wealth is defined as the farm’s net worth. 
 
 
IV. RESULTS 
 
Table 1 shows that, during the period studied, more than 62% of crop land was 
planted to program crops, a 26% was devoted to non-program commodities, 
being the rest left idle. Sample means also show that estimated PFC payments 
represent around 1.8% of farmers’ initial wealth. Of interest is the fact that, for 
the period of analysis, the expected profit per acre derived from non-program 
commodities outweighs the one obtained by planting program crops.  Also, 
during the period of study, 2 1var var( ) ( )Π > Π , which involves higher income risk 
derived from non-program crops.9 Two-stage nonlinear least squares parameter 
                                                 
8 This estimate is compared to actual government payments received by each farm. If estimated 
PFC payments exceed actual payments, the first measure is replaced by the second.  
9 Differences in the variance of profits might partly reflect the fact that while 1y  is a composite 
output, 2y  represents a single crop. 
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estimates for the first-order conditions of the land allocation decision (see table 
2) provide evidence that farmers in our sample are risk averse, and that the 
degree of risk aversion decreases with farmers’ wealth, i.e., farmers exhibit 
DARA preferences. Price, cross-price and payment elasticities of the proportion 
of land planted to program and non-program crops or left idle are presented in 
table 3. As expected, results suggest that an increase in its own price will 
generate an increase in the quantity of land planted to program crops. Quite the 
opposite, the price elasticity of non-program crops is negative. This result is not 
surprising given the high income risk associated to 2y  during the period of 
analysis. An increase in 2p  does not only involve an increase in mean income, 
but also a substantial increase in income variance. This lays out the necessary 
conditions for a failure in the ‘law of supply’, that contends that the quantity 
supplied by price-taking producers will rise in response to an increase in output 
prices. An increase in profit risk above the increase in its mean will originate this 
failure. This result is in accord with the findings of Just and Zilberman (1986). 
Results indicate that cross-price effects are negative for program crop and 
positive for non-program crop prices. Hence, a decline in program crop market 
prices ( 1p ) as a result of a decrease in price supports, will motivate a change in 
land use away from program crops in favour of non-program commodities. In 
contrast, farmers will respond to an increase in non-program crop prices by 
increasing land devoted to other uses such as program crops. The response of idle 
land to changes to market prices is quite different depending on whether it is the 
program or the non-program crop price that is shocked. An increase in program 
crop prices creates a strong incentive to reduce idle land to plant program 
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commodities.10 This shift in land use takes place because the increase in mean 
income originated by the increase in 1p  outweighs the increase in income risk. 
However, an increase in 2p  does not reduce idle land. Instead idle acreage is 
increased. As noted before, the high risk associated to the production of 2y  for 
the period studied is increased with an increase in the output price. The relevance 
of the risk effect relative to the mean effect motivates farmers to set some land 
aside as a form of self-insurance. Land use is also sensitive to government 
subsidies. An increase in decoupled payments reduces farmers’ degree of risk 
aversion and stimulates undertaking risky activities. This involves a reduction in 
idle land in favour of crop land planted to both program and non-program 
commodities.  
 Hence, our results show that agricultural policy decoupling is likely to 
have motivated a change in farmers’ crop mix. The extremely low values of 
subsidy elasticities relative to price elasticities allow to predict a reduction in the 
acreage planted to program crops in favour of non-program commodities and idle 
land.  
 
 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This paper investigates the effects of decoupling on farmers’ land allocation 
decisions and, specifically, on the crop mix and idle land. Coupled policies 
usually restrict farmers’ capacity to respond to market conditions by imposing 
restrictive supply management rules. In this regard, decoupling involves 
                                                 
10
 High idle land elasticities are partly due to the low initial values of this variable. 
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increased planting flexibility and thus may motivate changes in land allocation. 
Other aspects of decoupling can also influence land allocation decisions. These 
aspects are the reduction in price supports for program crops and their 
replacement by lump sum transfers, which are likely to involve changes in 
relative market prices and in farmers’ risk attitudes. 
 In order to show how these policy reforms could affect land use, we use 
an extended version of the Just and Zilberman (1986) model of production under 
uncertainty. Our model offers an improved picture of farmers’ behaviour by 
allowing to optimize land allocation in response to policy and by considering 
land idling among land use alternatives. Theoretical results show that, under the 
assumption of DARA preferences, an increase in lump sum transfers will 
increase farmers’ willingness to assume more risk. This could reduce the 
attractiveness of crop mix diversification away from program crops and in favour 
of non-program commodities as a strategy to manage farm income risk. This 
involves that this diversification will only be pursued if yields correlation 
between program and non-program crops is negative or takes low positive 
values, and if an increase in land allocated to program crops involves a 
substantial reduction in the profit variance. Under certain conditions of yields 
correlation, profit variance and mean income, a decrease in program crop price 
supports will motivate diversification away from these crops. Idle land will 
decrease as a result of a reduction in program crop prices, only if the mean effect 
of production is negative or if it is positive and the risk effect outweighs the 
mean effect. An increase in decoupled subsidies will motivate farmers to assume 
riskier enterprises and reduce uncultivated land.  
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 We use farm-level data collected in Kansas to illustrate our model and 
determine the effects of the FAIR Act on crop mix diversification. Our results 
show that decoupling could have induced a change in farmers’ crop mix by 
stimulating to reduce program crop acres in favour of non-program commodities 
and land idling.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Proof of proposition 1. By totally differentiating equation (3), the following 
expression can be derived: 
 
[ ]1 1 1 21 ν ν∂ ∂= − +∂ ∂
L R L
G D W
  (6) 
 
where 0D >  is the negative value of the second order condition of the 
optimization problem. If crop yields are negatively correlated (i.e. 0ρ < ), 
2 0ν < , which involves that 1 0
∂
>
∂
L
G
 if 1 1 2ν ν>L . If the correlation coefficient 
is positive (i.e. 0ρ > ), 2 ( )0ν > <  if  2
1
( )ϖρ
ϖ
> < . We can thus conclude that if 
2
1
0 ϖρ
ϖ
< <  and 1 1 2( )ν ν> <L , then 1 ( )0
L
G
∂
> <
∂
. Otherwise, if 2
1
ϖρ
ϖ
> , land 
allocated to program crops will increase with an increase in decoupled payments 
1 0L
G
∂ 
> ∂ 
. 
 
Proof of proposition 2. By totally differentiating equation (3), the following 
expression can be derived: 
 
( )1 1 21 1 1 2
1
_
1 1 1
1 ν ν
ε
 Π − Π   ∂ ∂ ∂
= − − +    ∂ ∂ ∂     
R W
LL y R L
p D A W D p p
 (7) 
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where 
( )1 1 2
1
_
1
ε
 Π − Π
− 
  
R W
L
y
A W
 represents the mean effect of production per 
unit of land, being 1 21
1 1
ν ν  ∂ ∂
+  ∂ ∂  
R L
p p
 the variance effect discounted to a 
certainty equivalent using the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion. 
Expression 1
1
ν∂
∂p
 represents the marginal variance of the marginal profit, and 
2
1
ν∂
∂p
 stands for a half of the change in the marginal variance of profit when 
1 0L = . Elasticity 
_
0R W
R W
W R
ε
∂
= <
∂
 represents the wealth elasticity of the 
Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion. 
 If yields correlation coefficient is negative ( 0ρ < ), then 1
1
0ν∂ >
∂p
 and 
2
1
0ν∂ <
∂p
, i.e., the variance of the marginal profit increases, but the marginal 
variance of profit decreases. In such a situation, the sign of the marginal risk 
effect is positive if  1 21
1 1
ν ν∂ ∂
>
∂ ∂
L
p p
 which involves 1
1
0∂ <
∂
L
p
. Otherwise, the 
marginal effect is negative and the sign of 1
1
L
p
∂
∂
 depends on the magnitude of the 
mean effect relative to the marginal effect. If yields correlation is positive, then 
1
1
( )0ν∂ > <
∂p
 if 1
2
( ) ϖρ
ϖ
< >  and 2
1
0ν∂ >
∂p
. This involves that if 1
2
ϖρ
ϖ
>  and 
1 2
1
1 1
ν ν∂ ∂
<
∂ ∂
L
p p
 , or if 1
2
0 ϖρ
ϖ
< < , then 1
1
0L
p
∂
<
∂
. 
 
Proof of proposition 3. See proof of proposition 2.  
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Proof of proposition 4. By totally differentiating equation (4), the following 
expression can be derived: 
 
2
1 1 1 0ϖ∂ ∂= − >
∂ ∂
L L R
G D W
 (8) 
 
Proof of proposition 5. By totally differentiating equation (4), the following 
expression can be derived: 
 
21 1 1 1
1 1 1
1
1 2R
dL y L R L p
dp D A W D
ε σ
 Π 
 = − −   
 
 (9) 
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Table 1. Summary statistics for the variables of interest 
Variable Mean 
(Standard deviation) 
n= 2,241 
1y  106.54 
(11.51) 
2y   118.74 
(27.85) 
1x  39.32 
(1.48) 
2x  28.17 
(1.49) 
1p  1.01 
 (0.06) 
2p  0.91 
 (0.06) 
w  
 1.02 
(0.03) 
1Π   67.55  
(7.07) 
2Π  79.61 
 (6.58) 
Note: all monetary values are expressed in constant 1998 currency units 
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Table 1. Summary statistics for the variables of interest 
Variable Mean 
(Standard deviation) 
n= 2,241 
1var( )Π   180.81 
 (22.43) 
2var( )Π  861.61 
 (111.13) 
1 2cov( )Π Π  268.39 
(18.76) 
0W  669,663.10 
(587,319.18) 
G  12,014.92 
 (9,233.03) 
1L  0.62 
(0.23) 
2L  0.26 
(0.24) 
3L  0.12 
(0.18) 
A  1075.90  
(827.46) 
Note: all monetary values are expressed in constant 1998 currency units 
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Table 2. Parameter estimates and summary statistics for the coefficients of risk 
aversion 
Parameter Mean predicted 
value 
(Standard 
deviation) 
η  0.034** 
(0.007) 
β  -0.353** 
(0.017) 
F-test ( 0η =  and 0β = ) 23,603** 
Note: Two asterisks (**) denote statistical significance at the α = 0.05 level 
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Table 3. Elasticity estimates  
Elasticity Mean value 
(Standard deviation) 
1 1_L p
ε  
1.9132** 
(0.1722) 
2 1_L p
ε  
-2.0844** 
(0.1217) 
3 1_L p
ε  
-5.5302** 
(0.6439) 
1 2_L p
ε  
0.1668** 
(0.0517) 
2 2_L p
ε  
-1.2794** 
(0.0816) 
3 2_L p
ε  
1.9433** 
(0.0934) 
1 _L G
ε  
0.0064** 
(0.0003) 
2 _L G
ε  
0.0055** 
(0.0003) 
3 _L G
ε  
-0.0460** 
(0.0024) 
Note: (**) denotes statistical significance at the α = 0.05 level 
